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Introduction 
 
On 31 December 2011 president Obama signed and thereby enacted the 
National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) for the Fiscal Year 2012.1 This act is 
an annual bill which enables the military to function around the world with the 
appropriate means. It is also an opportunity for the government to expand its 
powers in the war on terror if necessary. An opportunity it seized because the 
NDAA text affirms by law the President’s authority to detain, by means of the 
military... 
 
a person who was a part of or substantially supported Al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in 
hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners, 
including any person who has committed a belligerent act or 
has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy 
forces.2  
 
Since the beginning of the War on Terror in September 2001, President Bush 
has always claimed to have the authority to detain suspected terrorist 
indefinitely.3 As of 14 September 2001 the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (AUMF) was the President’s stringent but understandable reaction to the 
attacks on 9/11.4 It enabled him to act swiftly and retaliate to the horror done 
to his country. But little over a decade and a president later, not only are the 
indefinite detentions not over, the President even deemed it necessary to sign 
                                                 
* Wietse Buijs is lecturer in the section of Jurisprudence at the Erasmus School of Law 
(ESL) in Rotterdam. He acquired his master’s degree in law at the Erasmus School of 
law. He wrote his thesis about the suspension of habeas corpus during wartime in the 
United States of America. Currently, besides his day job, he is an external PhD-student 
with the section of Jurisprudence of the ESL on the subject of torture and terrorism in 
the wake of 9-11-2001.      
1 The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2012, 
 at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-112hr1540enr/pdf/BILLS-112hr1540enr.pdf 
(accessed on 30 December 2011). 
2 112th Congress, 1st Session, H1540CR.HSE, at: "National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2012." pp. 265-266 (accessed on 5 January 2012). 
3 "STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY" at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saps1867s_2
0111117.pdf (accessed on 5 January 2012).  
4 The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), at: 
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/sjres23.enr.html (accessed on 5 
January 2012).  
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an affirmation of the authority to detain suspected terrorists indefinitely, into 
law.5  
 
I. Turf War 
 
The fact that it is even possible for the President to affirm his authority is 
rather peculiar. It is peculiar because on 6 June 2008 the Supreme Court of the 
United States (hereafter The Supreme Court) issued its landmark case 
Boumediene v. Bush.6 This case should have made an end to a four year turf 
war with the executive and legislative branches of the government over 
detainee status and their rights in the war on terror. First off, I explain the 
existence of the turf war between the executive (hereafter the Bush 
Administration) and the Supreme Court. After this, in section II, I explain why 
Boumediene should have put an end to the turf war and why it did not. That 
leads to section III in which I describe the current status in the detainee 
litigation cases. After this, I discuss my conclusion in paragraph IV. 
As I wrote in the introduction, on 14 September 2001, just three days after the 
brutal attacks on America, the Bush Administration instigated the AUMF.7 It 
was a joint resolution by the President and Congress that enabled the 
Commander in Chief (the President): 
 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that 
occurred on September 11, 2001, or harboured such 
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts 
of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons.      
 
It dramatically increased the President’s power to deal with the new war on 
terror as he seemed fit. The implementation of the AUMF was very quick, and 
so was bringing war to the suspected terrorists and those nations who 
harboured them. President Bush already delivered an ultimatum to the Taliban 
on 20 September 2001 to turn over Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda leaders 
operating in the country.8 The invasion would follow on 7 October 2001 and, 
soon after, people started to disappear, not just from the battlefield in 
Afghanistan, but also in countries all over the world. These people were 
                                                 
5 President Obama did express his reservations about several provisions. He was not 
adamant about increasing his authority in these matters, but was obliged to sign the 
bill in order to be able to pass the budget for the military.  
6 Boumediende et al v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
7 The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) (2001), supra note 5, p. 1. 
8 G.W. Bush, Transcript of President Bush’s address, at:  
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ (accessed on 6 January 
2012). 
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designated as enemy combatants and were shipped to detention sites outside 
the United States. The most notorious of these detention sites is the Detention 
Centre at the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (GITMO). The first detainee 
arrived at GITMO the same day as the invasion in Afghanistan officially 
started.9 In order to eventually bring these enemy combatants to justice, 
President Bush issued an executive order to establish a military commission 
that would hold trials on the base.10 In order to try the detainees that were 
designated as enemy combatants, the President decided that all enemy 
combatants would not fall under the scope of the third Geneva Convention 
(“Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War”). This would make it easier 
and more effective to convict the terrorists. Perhaps it was more convenient to 
designate them as such, but it also generated a lot of criticism from around the 
world, especially from family members who in some cases didn’t even know 
where their loved ones were detained or even if they were still alive.  
 
The first case that made it to the Supreme Court was that of Rasul.11 Shafiq 
Rasul was detained at GITMO without trial and was not even given the 
possibility of being represented by a lawyer to challenge his detention. So his 
family, on behalf of Rasul, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge 
his detention. This petition was denied in every lower court, so it finally 
reached the Supreme Court for consideration. The Court reversed the District 
Court decision to deny the writ of habeas corpus in a 6-3 decision.12 They 
decided that the suspension clause in the Constitution which states that “the 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it” would have 
extraterritorial scope and therefore could be applied to the enemy combatants 
at GITMO.13 The detainees had to be given the right to challenge their 
confinement in a court of law by means of a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus. On the same day as the Rasul case, The Supreme Court issued another 
landmark case on the matter, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.14 The central question to be 
answered before the Court in this case was whether the Bush Administration 
did indeed have the authority to detain suspects who were designated as 
enemy combatants indefinitely. The answer again was no. Eight of the nine 
justices of the Court agreed that the Bush Administration did not have the 
power to hold a U.S. citizen indefinitely without basic due process rights 
enforceable through judicial review. 
                                                 
9 ‘Names of the Detained in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’, The Washington Post 2005, at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/guantanamo_names.html, (accessed 
on 6 January 2012). 
10 G.W. Bush, Military order of 13 November 2001, at: 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/mo-111301.htm (accessed on 6 January 2012). 
11 Rasul et al v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
12 The Supreme Court of the United States consists of nine justices who are appointed 
by the president for life. Every ruling the Court issues, is a result of individual voting of 
the members of the Court. The majority of a voting results in the Court’s decision.   
13 United States Constitution article 1, section 9: Limits on Congress.  
14 Hamdi et al v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507(2004). 
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Both cases were a slap in the face of the Bush Administration. The decisions 
were not at all what the Bush Administration expected. Challenging 
detainment through a petition of habeas corpus and granting (U.S.) detainees’ 
due process rights would seriously hamper any effectiveness in capturing 
terrorists in the War on Terror, or so the Administration deemed it. An 
additional law was necessary. The Administration’s reaction again was swift 
and decisive. Just a few months later (the average bill takes years to pass) 
President Bush signed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA).15 Although the title 
of the act suggests, and it actually is for a part, that the act is about the 
treatment of detainees, it also is a direct reaction to the Supreme Court cases 
stated above. It prohibited inhumane treatment of detainees, including those 
at GITMO and it required military interrogations to be performed according to 
the U.S. Army Field Manual for Human Intelligence Collector Operations. But it 
also stripped all federal courts (but one the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals) of 
any jurisdiction to consider habeas corpus petitions filed by detainees at 
GITMO, or other claims asserted by detainees against the US government. So 
the new DTA negated, at least in its intentions, the Supreme Court rulings 
deciding otherwise. 
 
The next round in the turf war presented itself in 2006. Another case was 
accepted by the Supreme Court for review. On 29 June 2006 Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld was decided by the Court.16 By means of Hamdan, the Court reacted 
to the DTA. The central question to be answered in this case was whether 
military commissions had the jurisdiction to try Hamdan, who was detained at 
GITMO and whether The Geneva Conventions should apply to the enemy 
combatants held in detention. Before answering these questions, Justice 
Stevens, for the majority of the Court, first denied a motion to dismiss the case 
by the Bush Administration. The Administration in its motion relied on the DTA 
which stated under section 1005 that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had the 
‘exclusive’ jurisdiction to review decisions in detainee cases tried before 
military commissions. The Supreme Court would not be denied the jurisdiction 
to review any legal case. In answer to the questions in dispute before the 
Court, the Court held that military commissions lack the authority to proceed 
because they were in violation of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice and 
common article three of the Geneva Conventions.17 So in return the Supreme 
Court decision negated the DTA in this case.  
 
Once again an answer from the Administration did not take very long. In 
repetition of his reaction in the previous round of the turf war, President Bush 
                                                 
15 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA 2005), at: 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/gazette/2005/12/detainee-treatment-act-of-2005-white.php 
(accessed on 6 January 2012). 
16 Hamdan et al v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557(2006), at: 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf (accessed on 6 January 
2012). 
17 Hamdan et al v. Rumsfeld., 548 U.S. 557, supra note 16.  
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signed a new act countering the Supreme Court decision, The Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006. This time the entire new law was a reaction 
to the Court’s decision. The turf war became even grimmer. In a message to 
Congress in consideration of passing the law, President Bush wrote: 
 
I transmit for the consideration of the Congress draft 
legislation entitled the ‘‘Military Commissions Act of 2006.’’ 
This draft legislation responds to the Supreme Court of the 
United States decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 
2749 (2006), by establishing for the first time in our Nation’s 
history a comprehensive statutory structure for military 
commissions that would allow for the fair and effective 
prosecution of captured members of al Qaeda and other 
unlawful enemy combatants. The Act also addresses the 
Supreme Court’s holding that Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions applies to the conflict with al Qaeda by 
providing definitions rooted in United States law for the 
standards of conduct prescribed by Common Article 3.18   
 
The new act had the sole purpose of thwarting Hamdan. This time the 
law clearly gave jurisdiction to the military commissions by bringing it 
under the scope of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Even worse, 
section 948b, under f stated that “no alien unlawful enemy combatant 
subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the 
Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.” A Convention I might add, 
the United States was and is a signing party to.  
The accumulation of the turf war came, as I discussed in the beginning in 
this paragraph, in 2008 with Boumediene. The Court held in a narrow 5-4 
decision that the detainees had a right to a writ of habeas corpus under 
the Constitution and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension 
of that right. Because of the fact that the United States have complete 
and utter control and jurisdiction, and thereby ‘de facto’ sovereignty 
over GITMO, detainees held there have the right to protection under the 
Constitution. On these grounds Boumediene should have been ‘a great 
victory.’19 It was meant as a definitive answer from the Supreme Court 
on how to interpret the Constitution in detainee cases.     
 
 
 
                                                 
18 G.W. Bush., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Message from President Bush, at: 
http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/message.pdf (accessed on 6 January 
2012). 
19 R. Dorkin, Why it was a great victory, New York Review of Books, 14 August 2008.  
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III. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals takes over 
It looked like a definitive case, except for the fact that it was not. Boumediene 
of course was sent for remand to the Court of Appeals of the D.C. Circuit Court. 
It is this Court that would turn out to be the Court in control of the detainee 
cases. The DTA and the MCA both appointed the D.C. Circuit Court as the only 
Court allowed to review any of the detainee cases. But contrary to the slim, 
progressive left wing majority in the Supreme Court (only in the instance of 
Boumediene by the way), the D.C. Circuit Judges were and are mostly 
conservative. And in some cases extremely conservative. It is fair to say that 
these judges weren’t really keen on implementing the new precedent. Some 
judges were not even very subtle in their criticism towards the Supreme Court. 
Senior D.C. Circuit judge Randolph even held public speeches called ‘The 
Guantanamo mess’ referring to the Boumediene precedent.20  
So after Boumediene most detainees sought their way, again, to the Courts in 
order to obtain a release order for their detention. But they eventually would 
reach the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in their appeal. The Court of Appeals for 
their part refused to release a detainee in every single detainee case that 
reached it. In their quest to overturn the Boumediene precedent they used a 
remarkable method, they used another Supreme Court ruling against the 
Boumediene precedent. As faith would have it, it was a case that was decided 
on the same day as Boumediene. Munaf v. Geren was a case where the court 
unanimously concluded that habeas corpus extends to U.S. citizens held 
overseas by American forces subject to an American chain of command, even if 
acting as part of a multinational coalition. It did not differ much from the view 
set out in Boumediene.  But the Court also found that habeas corpus provided 
the petitioners with no relief holding that "Habeas corpus does not require the 
United States to shelter such fugitives from the criminal justice system of the 
sovereign with authority to prosecute them."21 So the Boumediene case, 
dividing the Court 5-4, gave GITMO detainees, for the first time, a 
constitutional right to go to court to challenge their detention. But the 
unanimous Munaf decision, which had nothing in it explicitly about GITMO, 
held that federal courts could not control the U.S. military’s decision, in Iraq, to 
hand over to the Iraqi government American citizens who had allegedly 
committed crimes in that country. What the judges so cleverly did was use the 
broad interpretation of the Munaf decision to increase the executive power of 
the, by now Obama, Administration and diminish the precedent set out in the 
Boumediene case. The Circuit Court flatly ordered the District judges not to 
‘second-guess’ the Executive’s call on what to do with detainees, even those 
who had won release orders. So the result of this decision was that the Circuit 
Court of Appeals in no case approved an actual release. 
 
                                                 
20 A. Raymond Randolph., ‘The Guantanamo Mess,’ at: 
http://www.heritage.org/events/2010/10/guantanamo-mess (accessed on 6 January 
2012). 
21 Munaf et al v. Geren,  553 U.S. 674  (2008). 
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The logical step to take for the numerous defence lawyers of the detainees was 
to appeal to the Supreme Court for its consideration in these matters. And so 
they did. Just last year alone eight cases, for the most part consolidated cases 
regarding more than one detainee, reached the Court asking a writ of 
certiorari.22 All eight were dismissed. The Supreme Court did in all instances 
discuss the case but, in majority at least, did not see the need to grant 
certiorari. In consideration of the reason why the Court sees no need for 
further review of these cases, the Justices provide no definitive answer. There 
is certainly a great need to further explain the Court’s view in both 
Boumediene and Munaf, notwithstanding the fact that the D.C. Circuit Court 
has created a remarkable way of interpreting both precedents.  
It seems that a major reason or perhaps the only reason that the Supreme 
Court did not grant certiorari to any of the detainee cases is that there was, 
and still is, no majority for a coherent decision to be found. During Obama’s 
first term in office, two justices retired. Justices Souter and Stevens were 
replaced by Sotomayor and Kagan. As both Justices Souter and Stevens were 
fairly liberal justices and so are Sotomayor and Kagan, no change in balance in 
detainee matters would have been expected, except for the fact that justice 
Kagan was a Solicitor General of the United States prior to her appointment to 
the bench. As a Solicitor General she was directly involved in some of the cases 
she now had to judge. The consequence of course was that she had to recuse 
herself on all those cases. With justice Kagan out of the picture in detainee 
cases, the 5-4 split in Boumediene in favour of detainee rights would then be a 
4-4 stalemate. In case of a 4-4 split, no decision is made and the initial ruling by 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals stands, therefore the Supreme Court grants 
no certiorari in any of the detainee cases. Because of that, the D.C. Circuit 
Court of Appeals is in control over all detainee matters, a control that, for the 
moment, translates in ever diminishing rights for the persons held in indefinite 
detention.  
IV. Conclusion 
In this light, the enactment of the NDAA for the Fiscal Year 2012 with its 
affirmation of the President’s power to hold detainees indefinitely without 
trial, could not come at a worse time. The Obama Administration, and their 
predecessors in the White House, never made it a secret that they did not 
want the judiciary to interfere with their detainee policy in the war on terror. 
No matter the many detainees still waiting to be charged or tried. But the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals turns out to be a fierce ally of the Obama 
Administration in their quest for full and unchecked control over detainee 
matters. So if the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is not going to stop thwarting 
any injunction for release of a detainee and the Obama administration is still 
seeking more means (even with a reluctant President) to indefinitely detain 
those they see as suspects of terrorism, what is to become of the detainees?  
                                                 
22 A writ of certiorari is the formal American term for granting review to a case by the 
Supreme Court. 
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This would be the moment that the Supreme Court should perhaps step in and 
at least clarify its view on these matters. Otherwise it may become too late to 
stop another shameful period, the first of which they sought to end with 
Boumediene.  
 
 
 
- The Amsterdam Law Forum is an initiative supported by the VU University Library - 
 
